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Nicholas Negroponte, the MIT Media Labs 'onlie begeter' and one of digital techonologies most 
persuasive salespersons, has a new project.  With undeniable logic and unimpreachable intentions he 
wishes every Third World child to be given a laptop. His reasoning is that without education, all other 
attempts at development are doomed to fail and that since education can be accomplished by computers, 
the way to make good its grievous failings in the South is with computers.  He has therefore  developed 
an elegant device of considerable sophistication but great ease of use – a brightly-coloured, plastic-
encased clockwork-powered computer which costs (or rather, he promises, will cost) around $100. This 
contrivence, a toy in appearance but a serious machine in operation, is what he intends to give away in  
millions and, according to his own publicity, he has already apparently had great success both in 
persuading Southern governments – Rwanda, Libya, Uraguay – and manufacturers – Quanta Computers -- 
to back his scheme.  Negroponte's website is somewhat coy about how much money the initiative will 
involve but the budget is clearly in the order of billions: two billion children in the developing world x $100 
a machine.  Seed money alone -- from the likes of eBay, Google and Norstar, all at $2 million each -- 
would seem to exceed $12 million (<wiki.laptop.org> June 2007).  
 
Bill Gates, Negroponte explained at a presentation I witnessed in February 20071, does not like 
the idea merely, Negroponte suggested, because he is jealouse: Microsoft has never produced anything so 
elegant (and fun).  'Get a proper computer instead,' Gates is reported to have said (Johnson 2007:1). But 
there is perhaps another reason for Gates's hostility which Negroponte was ignoring. 20 to 30 watts of 
electricity can be easily generated with a few minutes of effort, he told his healthly, wealthy European 
audience, using the machine's pull-string; 'and,' he went on, 'a malnourished Third World child can 
manage 5 or 6 watts.'  
 
A Malnourished Third World Child?  
 
I would suggest that here Negroponte becomes a Marie Antoinette, but, instead of advising the 
French 18th century poor to eat cake as a substitute for bread, he proposes letting the South's huddled 
masses have little computers rather than life's other more obvious necessities.  Could it be that the 'let 
them eat laptops' implication of his grand plan was what upset Gates?  Perhaps Gates thought, as many 
might, there were more pressing priorities for the malnourished child than using her strength to fire up a 
product of high Western technology however much she might, or might not, learn from it. 
 
                                                 
1 INNOVACTION 2007 conference: Il Salone della Conoscenza, delle Idee e dell’Innovazione al servizio 
delle imprese, Udine, Italy, 15 -18 February.  
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I raise this not as a matter of debate around the issue of appropriate Third World technology, 
although that is obviously a serious concern, but rather as an extreme example of technicist hyperbole. 
Technological determinism, or technicism or diffusion theory (Rogers 1962), assumes, in the words of 
Raymond Williams (a hostile observor of the phenomenon) that: ‘a new technology -- a printing press or a 
communications satellite – “emerges” from technical study and experiment.  It then changes the society 
or the sector into which it has emerged’ (Williams 1989, 2007:120). This vision of the nature of 
technology ‘is an immensely powerful and now largely orthodox view of the nature of social change.  New 
technologies are discovered by an essentially internal process of research and development, which then 
sets the conditions of social change and progress’ (Williams 1974:13). It is this frame that underpins 
Negroponte’s ‘One Laptop Per Child’ scheme. Within a general unexamined assumption as to technology’s 
overall irresistible effectiveness, Negroponte further presupposes that in education, machines can 
substitute for traditional teaching methods.   
 
There is a history here of which he, and most, would appear to be unaware.  Every new 
communication device has been hailed in these terms –-- a revolutionary educational tool, transforming 
(or indeed, as potentially in this case even removing) the need for schools and schoolteachers. For Johann 
Creiling, lecturing at Tübingen University in 1702, it was the magic lantern that was going to revolutionise 
face-to-face teaching (Eder 1978).  Three centuries later, for Negroponte, it is a plastic clockwork 
computer. This is not to say that the computer has no more educational capacity than does a magic 
lantern. Obviously it does; but Negroponte is ignoring how teaching actually happens just as Creiling did 
and he therefore, like Creiling, hyperbolises the effectiveness of the machine. The result is that, like 
Creiling’s, his claims are overstated and the outcomes, as is already becoming manifest, are likely not to 
be as he prophesies. For him, apparently, the machine will of itself overcome poverty, war and pestilence 
in the South because those who use it, however malnourished, will be educated enough to avoid these 
perils. This is not, though, self-evidently the case. 
 
Negroponte’s is the essence of the technicist vision. But like all monocausal views – a crude 
Marxist economic determinism, say – technicism is inadequate as a way of explaining the world. And, 
because of its inherent inability to do so, the social effects it envisages are as often as not wildly at odds 
with what actually occurs. This is not to say that technology is not an immensely powerful social force. It 
is merely to point out that it is just one such force in the social sphere and thereby to deny it an 
overarching determining social role. So, a clockwork computer and teachers and classrooms and clean 
water and drugs and peace, etc., etc. might well achieve Negroponte’s laudable goals but the one machine 
alone will not. And the billions he proposes spending on it might well be better used in more direct ways. 
 
The view of technological developments underlying Negroponte’s scheme and his rhetoric is 
therefore of considerable moment. Technicism is no abstract mode of thought, no mere body of words 
without effects in the world. It is an intellectual construct with, like Marxism or religious belief, salient 
consequences.  
 
Technicism’s gravest problem is that it is disempowering. As Raymond Williams put it: ‘“We” 
adapt to it, because it is the new modern way’ (1989:120). In effect, supposedly, we have no choice. At a 
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most basic level, for example, technicism offers a justification for late capital’s consumerist drive. “We” 
cannot help ourselves when faced with a new technology but are forced in some way to adopt it.   
 
And the “we,” it can be noted, includes those selling the technology as well as those buying it. 
Apparently these sellers, in our case the global media conglomerates, can no more influence the 
communications industries than we can curb our consumerist instincts.  Instead of explaining their actions 
with (again, supposedly) outmoded concepts such as the concentration of capital, technicism understands 
these moguls to be the victims of ‘convergence.’  (This is not, of course, convergence in its prime -- albeit 
naïve -- technical sense that digitising pulse-code modulation renders signals, whether from microphone, 
camera or mouse, more or less identical electronically speaking; although it can be said, given human 
eyes continue to see and ears to hear, that how the visual and aural signals are encoded before reaching 
them is really not that significant.)  
 
The conglomerates’ oppressive, as it were, convergence arises from a secondary sense that 
technically similar infrastructural elements, such as PCM, force concentrated multi-media commercial 
structures into being. By this account, a Rupert Murdoch then, is not engaged in a search for world media 
domination for reasons of profit or even personal aggrandizement: he is merely in technology’s grip.  As 
one British politician put it: 'Technological changes are driving different sectors of the industry -- 
newspapers, television, telephony, video, computers, cable and satellite -- closer together.’ Of course, 
there are no necessary reasons whereby even identical technological means require single formations of 
capital; but for the technicist the technologies are the determining factor so this observation is 
unexamined. 
 
More than just communications are at stake here.  Twelve years ago, to take a random example, 
the then President of France, Francoise Mitterand, was articulating this received and unexamined 
contention in all embracing terms: ‘Science and technology are going to develop forcing humans to 
conceive of a different society.’ We were (and are) being asked by our leaders and the technicists who 
have their ear to see technology as, in some sense, an external force determining the social sphere even 
as, for example, we are also being called upon by these same politicians to deem actions conditioned by 
irrational ancient religious beliefs as the chief challenge confronting the West. And that is the essence of 
technicism’s dangers. It becomes a shill for late capital and its monocausality fails to take cognizance of 
social realities such as the malnourished children of the Third World.  
 
The roots of this failure of analysis lie in its way with history. Technicist accounts are history 
written by amnesiacs and, because they largely disregard the significances of social sphere, they 
comprehensively fail to explain why technologies appear when they do and for what purposes.  Here, at 
random, is the conventional story of one such technology – and story it indeed is – taken from a recent 
textbook: 
 
‘The basic principles of photography were described in a paper given in 1802 by the 
Englishman Thomas Wedgwood.  Another Englishman, Henry Fox Talbot, invented the 
negative process in 1839 and was awarded a patent in 1841.  The first photograph of a 
scene of nature was made in 1826 using the camera obscura invented in France by 
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Joseph Nicéphone Niépce.  Metal plates coated with silver idodine were first used by 
another Frenchman, Louis-Jaque-Mande Daguerre.  Celluloid film was introduced in 1888 
by George Eastman in the United States.  Color film was invented by Leopald D. Mannes 
and Leopold Godowsky, and was first marketed in 1935 by the Eastman Kodak 
Company’ (Noll 2007:40). 
 
It is not that this parade of dead white males (of whom we need know, it seems, nothing more 
than their nationality) is wrong – although it is in error in a number of particulars; rather, it does not 
explain why this somewhat confused chronology took place.  The implication is clear: these events, these 
‘inventions,' happen when they happen because that is when the technology becomes available in some 
way and individual genius realises this.  But, for example, could Wedgwood have given his paper  before 
1802?  Indeed he could, given that the recorded investigation of the effects of sunlight on silver oxides, 
the science at the heart of making a photograph, dates from half a century earlier.  Why then 1802?   
 
And why 1826?  The camera obscura was not ‘invented’ by Niépce, neither the box itself (which 
was a 16th century device which possibly existed some centuries earlier as it is derived from Arab 
astronomical practice of the 9th century at the latest); nor the lens (early medieval period at the latest); 
nor the plate (vide Wedgwood who not only wrote about but actually used silver nitrate, never mind  the 
general observation of the darkening or bleaching properties of light on certain metals and fabrics which 
had been known for millennia). Celluloid had been developed decades before 1888 and George Eastman 
entered a well-established field of business activity (actually in 1884, but let that be). And colour film, in a 
practical marketable form, dates from 1907 with a number of late 19th century precursors.  Mannes and 
Godowsky produced the first successful ‘tripack’ which was certainly the most viable method, but other 
systems were in existence and continued to be marketed for some time after – Technicolor for example 
(Winston 1996:39-57).  
 
The problem is not the errors, for even if a full and accurate history of the great men were 
inscribed we still would be none the wiser as to why things happened when they did exactly because, in 
fact, they did not occur when scientific understanding was to hand. The reasons for the rising interest in 
reprographic systems at the outset of the 19th century are entirely due to the emergence of the middle 
class and the beginnings of the establishment of a necessarily literate urban proletariat.  It is, primarily, a 
middle-class appetite for images to hang on their walls, illustrations for their books and cheap portraits of 
themselves which ‘invents’ photography.  The great men, who curiously all (and always) emerge at about 
the same time, do so less curiously because they are responding to general social forces around them. 
 
In this way it is not the Lumières, Edison, Prince, Arnott, Fox-Talbot, Dickson and co who ‘invent’ 
the cinema in 1895 – it is the vaudeville theatre’s audience who do so. One million tickets for popular 
theatrical entertainment were being sold a week in the United States alone. The term ‘show business’ (as 
opposed to ‘shows’) appears in print for the first time. The economic and social drivers demanded the 
mechanisation of entertainment and this produced in these years the cinema (and, it can be added, the 
phonograph, radio and the rest). It is in the social sphere, not the technological, we can find an answer 
the question posed by the critic Andre Bazin of cinematography – ‘why 1895?’ 
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This is not just a phenomenon of the 19th century.  The first digital device operated in the French 
Labs of an American telephone company in 1938. The man who ‘invented’ this as part of telephone 
exchange was Alan Reeves (an Englishman as it happened). But the science he was using, the formulae 
establishing necessary sampling rates dates back to the 1920s.  And the concept of the binary can be 
traced back centuries earlier. The first digital audio recorder, ‘in the metal’ as the engineers say, was 
brought to market in 1971.  Technological advance alone will not account for these delays since the bases 
for the technology were already to hand – with 20th century technologies as much as with 19th ones. 
 
The tendency to ahistoricism is well illustrated by the current insistence on a ‘digital revolution’ in 
general.  The digital devices, including the computer, that were to suffuse the market in the last quarter of 
the 20th century relied on solid state electronics which were not ‘invented’ (as is commonly believed) at 
the Bell Labs in 1948 but go back to experiments with semi-conductors in 1879.  Cats’ whiskers radios 
were the first solid-state technology to be widely diffused from the 1920s on (Winston 1998:208 et seq.).  
This is why one can claim that all too often technicist accounts, insofar as they are necessarily historical – 
else how can ‘revolutionary’ impact, for example, be established – tend to be histories written by 
amnesiacs. 
 
Puzzled by the lack of innovation in a basic sense at the time of the Industrial Revolution --- after 
all the power of steam had been known in antiquity – the Annaliste historian Fernand Braudel conceived of 
technology as existing in a social context where it is subjected to both pull and push: ‘First the 
accelerator, then the brake: the history of technology seems to consist of both processes, sometimes in 
quick succession:  it propels human life onward, gradually reaches new forms of equilibrium on higher 
levels than in the past, only to remain there for a long time, since technology often stagnates, or 
advances only imperceptibly between one 'revolution' or innovation and another’ (1979:430).  Braudel’s 
vision lies at the heart of a totally different approach to the issue of technological determinism. The 
Annaliste historians do not conceive of technology developing outside of the social sphere. For them it is 
not something to which ‘“we” adapt’; it is the product of what might be called ‘supervening social 
necessities’ (Braudel’s accelerators) and forces containing potential technologically-based social disruption, 
a process that might be called ‘the suppression of radical potential’ (Braudel’s brakes) (Winston 1998:3-
15).   
 
In the specific area of media technological history there has been a move over recent decades 
toward this view as a second less popularly understood approach that, in essence, denies technology as 
the main driver of social change.  Instead, society is conceived of as the major factor determining the 
technological agenda and conditioning the diffusion of the technologies it produces.  This ‘social shaping of 
technology’ – SST for short –puts the technologist into a broader social sphere where he or she, far from 
imposing the outcomes of their genius on us, is, as much as we are, the prisoner of social forces.   
 
SST as a concept emerges from the work of the Annaliste school (which pre-dates Braudel). 
Annales d'histoire economique et sociale, the journal, was founded in 1929 by Marc Bloch and others.  
Typifying the breakthrough these historians achieved is Bloch’s classic essay on the diffusion of the 
watermill in Medieval Europe. It says little about the technical knowledge leading to its development but 
concentrates on charges in feudal relations to explain its spread (Bloch 1935, 1967: 136-138).  According 
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to SST, then, the technological agenda is primarily determined by social needs and the successful diffusion 
of any given technology depends on its social acceptability, its ‘fit’ (as it were).  
 
SST has been making some progress. Under the impact of the dot.com fiasco of the late 1990s, 
even resolute technicsts can be seen to acknowledge that social forces other than technology might be in 
play. Facts intervene and not all technicists are like the Bourbon kings of whom it was said that they 
forget nothing and learned nothing.  Even in the midst of accounts which retain their essential 
technological monocasuality, one can now find current hyperbole being characterized as ‘a new wave of 
overpromotion and hype’ which is ‘again beginning to swell.’ Now, obviously since it has not happened, 
convergence of computers and telecommunications with hyperbolic consequence was merely a ‘supposed 
coming together’ (Noll 2007: 151, 136 emphasis added).  
 
But there are limits to this growing understanding.  Technicsts all too often display some of the 
characteristics of those Evangelicals who confidently predicted the Second Coming of Christ on 22 October 
1844 and, when this did not happen, just recalculated.   
 
Nicolas Negroponte, though, is not even yet in the recalculation business. He remains a true a 
believer although thus far all his highmindedness has achieved is to spot a new Western market.  The 
children of the South no more have his computer than they have adequate shelter, clean water, health 
care or peace.  But in the First World the possibilities of a really cheap laptop are now being actively 
explored.  Computer manufacturers, ignoring Negroponte’s purposes, see merely a rival device which of 
itself questions their profit margins.  Negroponte is infuriated with Intel, for example, which is now 
marketing Classmate, a small laptop with much the same specifications as his at $285. They think they 
can get theirs down to under $200. Negroponte has said, ‘Intel should be ashamed of itself’ (Johnson 
2007:1).  Others might think that cheap full service laptops are overdue and thank him for opening up the 
market.   
 
This row, of course, socially ‘fits’; it is the way the First World’s economic system works.  It is the 
social sphere (in which the technological is but one of many forces) where the fate of entities like Intel or 
the One Laptop Per Child not-profit organisation is determined.  Negroponte, faced with this reality, is 
attempting to water-down the essential technicism of his plan: ‘It's an education project,’ he now claims, 
‘not a laptop project.’  But a ‘laptop project,’ as Intel and others clearly understand is what it is.  
Negroponte’s vision, narrowed by his belief in the machine, is producing not the social amelioration he so 
confidently predicted but cheaper computers for privileged Westerners.  One Laptop Per Child is rapidly 
becoming a classic example of the limitations of technological determinism, essentially because as a 
technicist, Negroponte ignored essential social realities in his initial vision.  These are now returning to 
haunt him. 
 
Meanwhile, the malnourished Third World child, to the surprise of the technicist perhaps but not 
to those who put societal forces first, will, laptop-less, have to starve a little longer.  
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